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The Supreme Court's October 2006 term marked the onset of a
conservative legal revolution, according to many press accounts and
commentaries.' The addition ofChiefJustice Joho Robertsand Associate
Justice Samuel Alito created "the SupremeCourt that conservativeshad
long yearned for and that liberals feared," according to Linda
Greenhouse of the New York Times.' Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
declared the October 2006 term to be "the most overwhelmingly
conservative term since the 1930s."' By such accounts, a five-Justice
majority consistently moved the Court's jurisprudence in a rightward
direction in a string of ideologically charged cases, from abortion
restrictions and race-based school assignments to campaign-finance
regulations and litigant accessto federal courts.'
.~
I
Professor and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Westem
Reserve University School of Law. This Article is based upon remarks delivered OD
November 30, 2007 at the Regent University Law Reuiew symposium, "Justiciability After
Rein and Massachusetts: Where Is the Court Standing?" I would like to thank Erik Jensen,
Melvyn Durchslag, John Eastman, and David Wagner for their comments. All errors or
omissions are mine alone.
1 Where this Article uses the terms "conservative" and "liberal" to describe shifts in
legal doctrine, it is adopting the conventional usages of these terms in legal commentary-
2 Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2007. at 1, available at http1/www.nytimes.coml2007/07/0I1washingtoniOl
scotns,html?ex=1341028800&en=43ad643fl11e471e&ei=5124&partner=perma!ink&exprod
epermalink; see generally JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE TIlE SECRET WORLDOF '!'HE
SUPREMECOURT(2007) (discussing emergence of conservative majority on Supreme Court).
a Erwin Chemerinsky, Conservative Justice, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at AS5,
available at http://WWWJatimes.co:rolnewsiOPiniOnlla-oe-chemerinsky29jun29.0,5235222.
story.
4, See Greenhouse, supra note 2 ("Fully ~ third of the court's decisions, more th~ in
any recent term were decided by 5-to-4 margins Most of those. 19 of 24, were decided
along ideologicai lines, demonstrating the court's polarization whether on constitutional
1
I
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There is no question that the October 2006term was marked by an
unusually high number of 5-4 decisions decided along seemingly
ideologicallines. A single Justice, AnthonyKennedy,was in the majority
in every 5-4 decision,' meaning that the outcome of a case often
depended on whether he broke to the right or to the left. But the Court's
apparent rightward drift could have been an artifact of case selection
and the Court's ever-dwindling docket." In some cases, such as the
Court's approach to Article III standing, any conservative shift was
whollyillusory.
The Supreme Court considered standing in two high-profile cases
during the October 2006 term: Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation' and Massachusetts v. EPA.' Both were 5-4 decisions in
which the Court decided along traditional, ideological lines, and both
decisions may provide an indication of the future direction of the
Supreme Court. Yet neither case fits the conventional narrative of a
narrow majority shifting the law in a conservativedirection.
In Hein, a five-Justice majority denied taxpayer standing to
challenge the Bush Administration's so-called"faith-based initiatives" as
a violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Writing in
The New York Review of Books, Anthony Lewis claimed that in Hein a
five-Justicemajority "covertlyoverruledearlier decisions ... recognizing
the standing of members of the public to challengemeasures that assist
religious activities.t" Yet what is striking about Hein. is not that it
overturned prior decisions or shifted the Court's jurisprudence, but
rather that it hewed closelyto precedent, leaving the law of standing in
place.
Massachusetts was a far more consequential case than Hein, even if
it did not receive the same level of attention at the close of the Court's
j
fundamentals or obscure questions of appellate procedure."); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Five to
Four, THE NEW YORKER, June 25, 2007, at 35, available at
http://www.newyorker.comitalklcommentl2oo7/061251070625taco talk toobin.
5 See Greenhouse, supra note 2, at 18. - -
6 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, How Conservative Is this Court?, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE, July 5, 2007, http://article.nationalreview.com!?q=Y2Y3NjNkM2ZkYTcxNzQwYT
BhZWZkNzEyZGYyMWExMjE=.
t 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
9 Anthony Lewis, The Court: How 'So Few Have So Quickly Changed So Much',
THE N.Y. REV. OFBOOKS,Dec. 20, 2007, at 58, 59, available at http://www.nybooks.comlarti
cles/20899. See also Stephanie Mencimer, Supreme Court: Taking Care of Business,
MOTHER JONES, Jan. 25, 2008, available at http://www.motherjones.comiwashinglon_dis
patch/2008l0l/supreme-court-pro-business-out-of-touch.html (stating that the decision in
Hein "overturned years of precedent").
•term.'? In Massachusetts, the Court broke new ground as it took several
steps in a decidedly "liberal" direction." The five Justice majority's
conclusion that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the
En~ir?nmental Protection Agency's refusal to regulate greenhouse-gas
emISSIOnsfrom new motor vehicles is potentially quite consequential.
Massachusetts may have produced greater substantive change than any
other decision of the October 2006 term, despite the Court majority's
claims of adhering to precedent."
Both Hein and Massachusetts are potentially significant standing
opinions-the latter for what it did, and the former for what it did not
do. Both decisions involved generalized grievances about federal-
government policies that affect citizens as a whole,but point in opposite
directions. Only Justice Kennedy joined the judgment in both opinions-
indeed, only Justice Kennedy seemed satisfied with the two holdings. In
many respects, the opinions are in significant tension with each other
and embrace competing conceptions of the role of the judiciary in the
separation of powers. What neither decision did, however, is etch a
conservative imprint on the law of standing.
The rather modest aim of this Article is to untangle what the
Supreme Court did, or did not do,with regard to standing last term. This
analysis may not produce any profound conclusions about the future
course of the Roberts Court. It can, however, illuminate how the current
Court approaches the question of justiciability and, as a consequence,
the Court's approach to the separation of powersand its conceptionof its
own role in policing executive conduct in contestedpolicyareas.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overviewof standing doctrine
as it has been traditionally conceivedand its role in the separation of
powers, particularly in the context of generalized grievances. Parts II
and III turn to Hein and Massachsuetts respectively,explainingwhat the
Court did (and did not dol with regard to standing in each case. Part IV
considers what the Hein and Massachusetts decisions suggest about the
Court's conception of separation of powers and highlights some tensions
between and conceptual problemswithin the Court's approach to judicial
oversight of executive action in the two cases.




10 One potential explanation for the relative lack of att~n~onto Massachus,etts at
the end of the Court's term is the timing of the respective npimons. Whereas Hem was
among the high-profile decisions handed down at the end of the term, Massachusetts was
decided over two months earlier, on April 2, 2007.
11 See Jonathan H. Adler Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA.L. REV.
IN BRIEF 61 (2007), htipJ/wwW.Virginialawreview.orgiinbrieIl2007/05l211adler.pdf
(discussing the legal implications of Massachusetts); Ronald A. Case, Massachusetts v.
EPA, The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 73 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreView.orgiinbriefl2007/05l211Cass.pdf (discussing departures from
precedent in the Massachusetts decision).
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I. STANDING AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
Standing is a key element ofjusticiability. For a plaintiff to invoke
the jurisdiction of an Article III court, he or she must demonstrate the
existence of standing. This entails satisfying requirements that
demonstrate a given plaintiff is the proper individual to bring the issue
to federal court. Without standing, there is no "case or controversy"
under Article III of the Constitution." "Courts resolve cases, not
philosophical disputes, beauty contests, or questions of foreign policy,"
comments Professor Eugene Kontorovich.> Standing cases are
particularly important because standing doctrine helps determine who
can, and whocannot, pursue certain claimsin federal court.
There is some debate over the constitutional grounding and
historical provenance of the standing requirement." Scholars dispute
whether the text or original meaning of Article III imposes a standing
requirement. By some accounts, standing did not emerge as a
requirement ofjusticiability until the early twentieth century, as courts
sought to limit litigation against the growing administrative state.'·
What is not in dispute, however,is that standing is nowunderstood to be
an essential componentofjusticiability under Article III.
There are several justifications for the standing requirement, such
as the need to ensure sufficient adversity between the parties" and to
13 The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Parly;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States,-between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects,
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
14 Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1670
(2007).
15 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L,J, 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public
Actions: The Non-Hohfeldion or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA_ L. REV. 1033 (1968);
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN.
L. REv. 1371 (1988); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrines, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004).
16 See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y,U, L. REv. 962, 1009 (2002)
(arguing standing doctrine was fabricated by the Supreme Court in the twentieth century),
17 See. e.g., Martin H, Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions,
the Case-or.Controversy Requirement. and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U.
cm. L. REv. 545, 545--49 (2006) (Article Ill's case or controversy requirement ensures
adequate adversity between the partiea.). But see Richard A. Epstein, Standing and
2008]




vindicate individual rights." For several decades, however, standing
doctrine has been grounded in contemporary notions of separation of
powers and the role of the judiciary in providing a check on the other
branches. As Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court in 1984, "the law of
Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers."" The law of standing helps define the role of the federal
judiciary under the Constitution. Indeed, it can be said that "'[nlo
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court
jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.""o
Contemporary standing doctrine growS out of the 1923 case of
Frothingham v. Mellon in which the Court held that generalized
grievances, such as a federal taxpayer's complaint that federal funds are
being spent in an illegal or unconstitutional fashion, are insufflcient to
confer standing on a litigant." In Frothingham, a taxpayer sought to
challenge the constitutionality of the federal Maternity Act of 1921 on
the ground that the law exceeded the scope of Congress's spending
power?2 Rather than address the merits of the petitioner's claims, the
Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, explaining that an
individual taxpayer did not have a sufficiently personal injury to invoke
federal_courtjurisdiction.23 The Court explained that
interest in the moneys of the Treasury ... is shared with millions of
others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect
upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote,
fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to
the preventive powers of a court of equity.24
The principles motivating contemporary-standing doctrine predate
Frothingham, however, and can be traced to the founding era. As Chief
Justice John Marshall noted in Marbury v. Madison, "[tlhe province of
the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals .... "25 Such
•
Spending-The Role of Legal and Equitoble Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1,.46-4
7
(2001)
(arguing ideological plaintiffs are likely to be sufficiently adverse to satisfy this concern).
16 See, e.g., Lea Brilroayer, The Jurisprudence of Article Ill: Perspectives on the
"Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. MV. 297, 30&-15 (1979) (aroong. the
purposes of standing is the proper representation of rodiVlduals .and self_deterrom~\IOn),
see also Kontorovich, supra note 14, at 1666 (standing "prevent!s] meffiClent dispOSItions of
constitutioual entitleroents" and enables individuals to deterroroe the best use of their own
rights).
" Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). .
20 Raines v. Byrd, 521 us. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare RIghts
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)).
21 262 U.S. 447, 48&-87 (1923).
22 Id. at 479 .
23 [d. at 480, 487.
24 Id. at 487.
25 5 U.S. (1 (jranch) 137, 170 (1803).
180 REGENT UNNERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 20:175
cases stand in contrast to those that are "political"in that "[tjhey respect
the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive,
the decision of the executive is conclusive."26Where the rights of
individuals are at stake, the judiciary is within its element, and properly
exercises the authority of judicial review, even if that means second-
guessing or overruling the actions of a coordinate branch. Yet when
individual rights are not at stake, constitutional qnestions are properly
left to the political branches, each of which has an independent
obligation to uphold and enforce the Constitution. As Chief Justice
Roberts observed in a law review article in 1993, "Byproperly contenting
itself with the decision of actual cases or controversies at the instance of
someone suffering distinct and palpable injury, the judiciary leaves for
the political branches the generalized grievances that are their
responsibility under the Constitution."27
All citizens may have an interest in seeing to it that the government
complies with the Constitution and laws enacted pursuant to
constitutional authority. But this does not mean that all citizens suffer a
judicially cognizable injury when the federal government fails to abide
by the legal limits of federal power. As the Court explained in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, "a plaintiff raising only a generally available
grievance about government-elaiming only harm to his and every
citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, ...
does not state an Article III case or controversy."28Such grievances are
best brought to the attention of elected representatives and the
electorate at large, rather than Article III courts.
One thing that flowsfrom these principles is that federal courts lack
jurisdiction to hear claims that consist ofnothing more than "generalized
grievancels]" that are "'commonto all members of the public.'"2' As the
Court explained in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,
"To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to require a court
to rule" on important questions of national-c-or even international-
importance "would create the potential for abuse of the judicial process,
distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and
the Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of
providing 'government by injunction.'"30This would not be a proper role
for the judiciary. As Chief Justice Marshall himself warned, "If the




26 Id. at 166.
27 John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219,
1229 (1993).
28 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
29 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 17&-77 (1974) (quoting Ex parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)).
30 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222.
United States[,] . . . [t]he division of power [among the branches of
government] could exist no longer, and the other departments would be
swallowed up by the judiciary."" This is so even if this means that there
are constitutional questions that, as a consequence, may never corne
before the courts in a justiciable case. As strange as it may sound to
some, not all constitutional questions must be resolved in federal court.
Some constitutional questions are left to the political branches.
The constitutional requirements of standing to sue in federal court
are injury,32 causation," and redressability." Article III standing
requires an "injury-in-fact" that is both actual or imminent and concrete
and particularized." The cause of this injury must be "fairly ...
trace [able] to the challenged'" conduct." Finally, the injury must be
redressable by a favorable ruling on the merits of the claim." Taken
together, these three elements are understood as the "irreducible
constitutional minimum" required to demonstrate standing."
These traditional requirements create problems for federal
taxpayers who wish to challenge the expenditure of funds by the federal
government.w While the illegal or unconstitutional expenditure of tax
dollars may well constitute a concrete injury, federal taxpayers, as such,
do not suffer any particularized injury from such expenditures, nor can
they claim that any injury to them, again as taxpayers, will be redressed
by a favorable court ruling. In the typical case, a federal taxpayer cannot
plausibly claim that a court judgment that a given expenditure or
appropriation is unconstitutional will reduce his or her tax burden.
The traditional requirements for standing have also posed a
particular problem for environmentalist plaintiffs. Environmental
injuries have not always translated into judicially cognizable injuries-in-
fact, fairly traceable to allegedly illegal government conduct that can be
redressed by a favorable court ruling. Much environmental litigation
involves alleged harms to the environmental commons-unowned or
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31 C.J. John Marshall, Speech at the House of Representatives, on the Resolutions
of The Honorable Edward Livingston (Mar. 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERSOF JOHN MARSHALL
82,95 (Charles T. Cullen & Leslie Tobias eds. 1984).
32 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U,S, 737, 756 (1984)).
33 [d.
" Id. at 561 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
35 Id. at 560 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S, 149,155 (1990); Allen, 468 u.s,
at 756).
36 Id. (quoting Simon, 426 Ll.S. at 41).
37 Id. at 561 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
38 Id. at 560.
39 See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Sy.sterru:tic Study of a
(Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORYL.J. 771 (2003) (noting differences between
. . . . t th fi deral government and standing for
standing for federal taxpayers In suits agaUlS e e
state or local taxpayers suing state or local governments),
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public spaces in which few, if any, have distinct and particularized legal
interests. Especially where such plaintiffs have sought to address
widespread environmental harms, such as those due to global climate
change or other widely dispersed phenomena, it is difficult for plaintiffs
to demonstrate that they have suffered actual, discrete, particularized
injuries of the sort that Article III requires.
Both federal taxpayers and environmentalist plaintiffs present
claims that are often best characterized as the sort of "generalized
grievances"unfit for judicial resolution in an Article III court. Over the
past few decades, federal courts have been required to revisit the
standing of federal taxpayers and environmental plaintiffs time and
again. In Rein and Massachusetts, the Court addressed both, but with
not entirely consistent results.
II. REIN V. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION
The Rein litigation arose from a challenge to the Bush
Administration's so-called "faith-based initiative."" In 2001, the
President created the Officeof Faith-Based and Community Initiatives
("OFCI")as a part of the Executive Officeof the President through an
executive order." The stated purpose of this office was to provide
religious organizations the opportunity to "compete on a level playing
field" with their secular counterparts in receipt of federal funds and
provision of social services." No legislation specifically authorized the
creation of this office." Rather, the President created the faith-based
initiative unilaterally and funded its activities out of general
appropriations to the ExecutiveBranch."
The Freedom fromReligionFoundation ("FRF")filed suit in federal
court alleging that the initiative violated the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause." Specifically, FRF objected to conferences
organized by OFCI at which speakers used excessivelyreligious imagery
and extolled the effectivenessof faith-based organizations at delivering
needed social services.w Particularly objectionable to FRF was the
suggestion that faith-based programs might be more effective because
they are faith-based. Such activities, FRF maintained, had the intent or
•
•
'0 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
'1 See id.; Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2001), reprinted in 3 U.s.C. Ch. 2
(Supp. I). Through separate executive orders, the President also created similar offices in
various executive agencies.
42 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559; Exec. Order, supra note 41 .
• 3 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2560.
44 Id.
45 ld. The Establislunent Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST.amend. I.
46 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2560.
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effect of promoting religious social service organizations over their
secular counterparts, in violation of the First Amendment's prohibition
on the establishment of religion.s? From the start, this was a "lawsuit
destined to go nowhere . . . ."48 Under existing precedent, FRF's
substantive claims were quite a stretch. Yet the case nonetheless found
its way to the High Court on the threshold question of FRF's standing to
raise its claim at all.
FRF lacked the sort of connection to the OFCI's activities that
would normally suffice to establish standing for an Establishment
Clause claim. No member of FRF was subjected to these remarks or
attended the relevant OFCI conferences, nor did any members of FRF
claim that they had been excluded from participation in OFCI activities
because of their secular orientation or criticism of religious
organizations. Rather, the sole asserted basis for FRF's standing to
challenge the OFCI was that the plaintiffs were federal taxpayers who
were "'opposed to the use of Congressional taxpayer appropriations to
advance and promote religion.'"'·
FRF's only alleged injury was the expenditure of taxpayer dollars by
OFCI on activities that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause.
This made FRF's case difficult from the start. As noted above, taxpayer
standing is generally disfavored. Under longstanding precedent, federal
taxpayers do not have distinct interests that can justify invoking the
power of the federal courts. In simple terms, "interests of the taxpayer
are, in essence, the interests of the public-at-large ... ."50 Were such
suits allowed, and "every federal taxpayer could sue to challenge any
Government expenditure," the result would be that "the federal courts
would cease to function as courts of law and wouldbe cast in the role of
general complaint bureaus.r'"
FRF sought to rely onFlast v. Cohen, a 1968case in which a di~ided
Court found taxpayer standing to challenge CongresSIOnal
appropriations allegedly violative of the Establishment Clause." Flast
involved a challenge to federal grants to religious schools under the
Elementary & Secondary Education Act of 1965.53 In Flast, th~ Court
held that taxpayers could have standing to challenge legislative
1
I 'I,
47 Id. at 2561. ..
48 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: He~ v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudicatum 1-2, 2008 BYU L. REv.
1~1~ . .' 0
49 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting Petition for Wnt of CerllOran, app. at 69a '11 ,
Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (No. 06-157), 2006 WL 2161324).
50 Id. at 2563.
51 Id. at 2559.
" 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
53 [d. at 85.
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exercises of the federal taxing and spending power under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution that allegedly exceed specificconstitutional
limitations on federal power, such as the Establishment Clause.w
Whereas citizens cannot generally sue the federal government seeking
nothing more than compliancewith the Constitution, a taxpayer could
challenge the constitutionality of a Congressional appropriation that
allegedly violated the prohibition on government establishment of
religion.
As handled by the Court's majority, Flast created an exception for
challenges to a subset of federal legislative acts involvingexercise of the
Congressional taxing and spending power." Hein, on the other hand,
involved a challenge to an executive act: the administration of funds used
by the presidentially created OFCI. Therefore, plaintiffs could not avail
themselves of the Flast exception to the bar on taxpayer standing. As a
consequence, FRF lacked standing and federal courts lacked Article III
jurisdiction over the case. That the expenditures at issue were
ultimately derived from appropriations approved by Congress was
deemed immaterial, as the specific expenditures were not expressly
approved by a legislative act." The OFCI was wholly a creation of the
Executive Branch.
The Flast distinction relied upon by the Court's majority is not
particularly compelling. Indeed, a majority of the Hein Court joined
opinions explicitly rejecting any constitutional grounds for
differentiating between challenges to legislative and executive acts for
standing purposes. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred
separately to call for overruling Flast entirely,57 while four Justices-
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer-dissented, arguing for a more
permissive approach to taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause
cases."
Justice Alito's opinionfor the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kennedy, repeatedly stressed that it declined to extend Flast
5. [d. at 102.
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the
taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of
legislative enactment attacked .... Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a
nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged.
[d.
55 Hein, 127 S. CI. at 2566 ("Flast 'limiled taxpayer slanding to challenges directed
only [at] exercises of congressional power' under the Taxing and Spending Clause."
(quoting Valley Forge Christian CoIL v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 479 (1982) (alteralion in original».
5S [d. at 2566--69.
57 See id: at 2573-74, 2582-84 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58 See id: at 2584-86 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 2561Hi6, 2568 (majority opinion).
60 454 U.S. 464 (1982). . . . . h
61 Justice Alito's opinion even criticized Flast for its failure to give suffiCIent weig t
to separation of powers concerns. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2569.
62 Id t 2571' at 'd at 2568 ("Flast focused on congressional action, and we. a ,see so t . di ti E ti e
must decline this invitation to extend its holding to encompass sere ionary xecu IV
Branch expenditures."). - u;
.3 Id at 2572 (Kennedy J. concurring). Justice Kennedy explallled that .[tjhe. , , ., . t . and unremitting
~ourtsmust be reluctant to expand their authority byrequmng.1D- rus.
lVe
" ld 2573
Judicial management of the way the Executive Branch performs Its duties. . at .
G. Id.
65 [d.
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to permit challenges to executive allocationsof federal tax dollars," and
that the executive-legislative distinction had been embraced in
subsequent decisions such as Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State.GO Yet Justice
Alito's opinion conspicuously failed to defend the Flast holding on its
own terms.v! Rather, Justice Alito explained, principles of stare decisis
did not require expanding such a questionableprecedent "to the limit of
its logic."'2
Only one member of the Court, Justice Kennedy, sought to defend
the Flast holding without seeking to expand it to all taxpayer
Establishment Clause challenges to allegedly unconstitutional use of
federal funds. "Flast is correct and should not be called into question,"
Justice Kennedy briefly explained, because it embraced "the
Constitution's special concern that freedom of conscience not be
compromised by government taxing and spending in support 'of
religion;" At the same time, Justice Kennedystated that Flast did not
require judicial oversight of executive activities.Allowingchallenges to
discretionary executive functions, such as the content and conduct of
conferences sponsored by various White House offices,would involve
excessive intrusion into the functioning of the Executive Branch,
threatening to turn courts into "speech editors for communications
issued by executive officials and event planners for meetings they
hold."64This did not relieve the Executive Branch of its constitutional
obligations, Justice Kennedy hastened to add. Denying standing to
federal taxpayers in such cases would not excuse executive-branch
officials "from making constitutional determinations in the regular
course of their duties" and obeyingconstitutional limitations on federal
power." It would, however, limit judicial enforcement of such
constitutional limits.
Justice Kennedy's opinion did not offer a particularly compelling
defense of the Flast rule as applied in Hein. Perhaps this is becausesuch
186 REGENT UNNERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 20:175
a rule is difficult to defend." As noted above, Justice Kennedy is the only
member of the Court to even suggest that whether a taxpayer seeks to
challenge legislative or executive action should make a difference for
standing purposes.
The most compelling explanation offered for the Court's holding was
stare decisis.s" Flast contained limiting language stressing the "nexus"
between a federal taxpayer and the authorization of funds by Congress
under the taxing and spending power of Article I, Section 8.68 The
Court's subsequent decision in Valley Forge Christian College explicitly
reaffirmed the distinction between legislatively authorized expenditures
and discretionary allocations of federal dollars by executive officials.w
Thus, whatever Hein's faults, overturning (or even curtailing) existing
precedent was not among them. While the decision may not have yielded
a particularly coherent holding, nothing in Hein explicitly or implicitly
moved the law in a "conservative" direction or closed the courthouse door
on parties that previously had access. For good or ill, it applied existing
precedent and left the law as it was.
66 During a humorous portion of the Hein oral argument, United States Solicitor
General Paul Clement noted the difficulty of making sense of Flast and other related
precedents:
JUSTICE ALITO: General Clement, are you-are [you] arguing that these lines
that you're drawing make a lot of sense in an abstract sense? Or are you just
arguing that this is the best that can be done that this is the best that can be done
[sic] within the body of precedent that the Court has handed down in this area?
GENERAL CLEMENT: The latter, Justice A1ito.
(Laughter.)
GENERAL CLEMENT: And I appreciate-I appreciate the question.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Why didn't you say so?
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE SCALIA: I-I've been trying to make sense out of what you're saying.
(Laughter.)
GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, and I've been trying to make sense out of this
Court's precedents.
(Laughter.)
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (No. 06-157), 2007 WL
609740.
67 See Heinl 127 S. Ct. at 2571.
68 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102; see also Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565 ("Given that the alleged
Establishment Clause violation in Flast was funded by a specific congressional
appropriation and was undertaken pursuant to an express congressional mandate, the
Court concluded that the taxpayer-plaintiffs had established the requisite 'logical link
between [their taxpayer] status and the type of legislative enactment attacked." (quoting
Flast, 392 U.S. at 102)).
69 See 454 U.S. at 479 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 228 (1974)).
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III. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA
Whereas Hein conformed to existing (albeit irrational) precedent,
Massachusetts staked out new territory. In finding that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA's
failure to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions under the Clean Air Act,
the Court departed from existing precedent and invented new doctrine."
Even where the Court purported to followprior decisions, it applied
those holdings in a particularly flexiblefashion.WhileMassachusetts did
not produce what most would characterize as a "conservative"result, it
was nonetheless one of the most consequentialdecisionsofthe term.
The Massachusetts litigation arose out ofa rulemaking petition filed
with the EPA in 1999 calling upon the Agencyto regulate greenhouse-
gas emissions from new motor vehicles under Section 202 of the Clean
Air Act.71At the time, the EPA's General Counsel accepted the claim
that the EPA possessed the authority to adopt such regulations.v but
under the Clinton Administration the EPA declined to act, neither
accepting nor rejecting the rulemaking petition. Once the Bush
Administration took over, the EPA disavowedany intention to regulate
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. When environmentalist
groups threatened legal action, the Bush EPA formally rejected the
initial petitions on the grounds that the EPA lacked the legal authority
to regulate greenhouse gases without express approval fromCongress."
Although there is language in the CleanAir Act that couldbe applied to
greenhouse gases, the EPA maintained that these provisions were
designed to address conventional air pollution problems, such as soot
and smog, rather than control global atmospheric pollutants." Even if
the EPA had such authority, the EPAnowargued, it wouldbe un-:ise to
do so given scientific uncertainty and the need for coordmated
international action on climate change."
After the EPA denied the rulemaking petition, several states and
environmentalist groups promptly filed suit, alleging that th~ EPA had
adequate statutory authority to control vehicular emiSSIOnsof
greenhouse gases and that the agency failed to offer an adequate
70 See Adler supra note 11' Cass, supra note 11.
71 Clean Ai: Act, sec. 202: § 202(a)(6), 104 Stat. 2399, 2473-74 (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 752I(a)(I) (2000)).
72 S M d fr J than Z Cannon General Counsel, EPA, to Carol M.ee emoran urn. om Dna ., . . - .
Browner, Administrator, EPA (Apr. 10,1998), available at http://www.VITglrnalawrevlew.
orglinbriefJ2007f05l211cannon-memorandum.pdf.
73 See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
59,925-29 (Sept. 8, 2003).
74 See id: at 59,926-27.
75 See id; at 52,931.
)..
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explanation for failing to regulate." A three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit splintered
over the petitioners' substantive claims, as well as over the threshold
question of whether Massachusetts or any other party had standing to
file suit.?? Judge Tatel would have found that Massachusetts had
standing to sue because of the threat of sea-level rise posed to the
Commonwealth's coastline." Judge Sentelle, on the other hand, argued
that global climate change, as a global phenomenon, did not produce the
sort of particularized injury standing requires.t? Judge Randolph
assumed standing, without resolving the question, and held for the EPA
on other grounds, producing a 2-1 split in favor of the Agency.soGiven
the fractured ruling of the D.C. Circuit, and the subsequent opinions
dissenting from the Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc,81Supreme
Court reviewwas inevitable.
It was always clear standing would figure prominently in the
Court's decision. Standing questions occupied a siguificant portion of
oral argument. Yet few expected the Court to cavalierly loosen existing
standing requirements, let alone announce a new rule for state standing
in lawsuits brought against the federal government-and yet that is
what the Court did. Faced with a claim that did not easily satisfy the
traditional requirements of standing, a five-Justice majority proceeded
to put its thumb on the scales so the case couldproceed.
An initial difficulty for petitioners' standing claim was the
undifferentiated nature of greenhouse warming. Global climate change,
by definition, affects the global climate. Emissions anywhere on the
globe affect the overall concentration of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere for the earth as a whole. The resulting greenhouse effect is
likewise a globalphenomenon,even if it couldproducedifferent effects in
different regions. As a consequence, injuries predicated on global
warming would seem to constitute the archetypal "generalized
grievance" common to all members of the public and thus be unfit for
judicial resolution. In this regard, claims of injury from globalwarming
are much like the claims of injury asserted by federal taxpayers in
76 See Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated Cases at 14, 54-56,
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-1361 to 03-1368), 2005 WL
257460.
77 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 54--56 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reu'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(2007).
78 [d. at 65 (Tatel, J., dtssenting) (citing Tozzi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
79 ld. at 60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment),
80 [d. at 55-56, 58 (majority opinion).
81 Massachusetta v. EPA, 433 F.3d 66, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (denying
Petition for Rehearing En Bane),
j
taxpayer suits. The common and undifferentiated nature of the injury
precludes justiciability. The question is not whether climate change is
real, or whether human activities have contributed and will contribute to
a warming of the atmosphere, but rather whether global changes that
affect all citizens of the United States-indeed all citizens of the world-
are sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy Article Ill's
requirements.
Insofar as petitioners alleged current harm from changes in the
global climate, they alleged a grievance they "sufferj]in some indefinite
way in common with people generally."" Indeed, one could argue that
the harms from anthropogenic climate change are even more dispersed
and generalized than the injuries allegedly suffered by individual
taxpayers when funds are spent unconstitutionally. Current changes in
the global climate are felt by all U.S. citizens-indeed by all citizens of
the world. Yet as the Court noted in another context, "[t]he relevant
showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury to the
environment but injury to the plaintiff."83 That climate change is an
urgent concern matters not at all in the standing analysis, for the
question is one ofwhether federal courts should intervene, not whether a
given question is worthy offederal action.
Massachusetts's injury-c-or at least the only injury considered by
the majority-was its claim of present and future sea-level rise
exacerbated by human contributions to the greenhouse effect." While
some portion of sea-level rise is due to natural phenomena, the
petitioners submitted affidavits detailing estimates and projections of
future increases in sea level over the next several decadesthat wouldbe
due, in part, to human emissions of greenhouse gases. Insofar as
petitioners' standing claim was dependent on such future projections,
such as potential losses of coast "by2100,"85 the injuries allegedwere too
remote and distant in time to satisfy the traditional requirement that an
alleged injury be "actual or imminent"; a future injury wouldnot do. In
j"I'i:,
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82 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U,S. 447, 488 (1923),
83 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U'S. 167, 181 (2000)
(emphasis added). '
84 It is worth noting that the majority opinion misquotes ~herelevant. ~daVlts so
as to overstate the contribution of global warming to sea·level rrse. The majority asserts
that "global sea levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20t~
century as a result of global warming." Massachusetts, 127 S. C~.at 1456. Yet t~e~daV1t
cited for this proposition is more circumspect, merely stating th~t w~g-~ndu;ed
melting of glaciers and thermal expansion of the oceans "were the major contributions to
the estimated sea-level rise of 10 to 20 centimeters over the past century. Massachusetts,
127 S, Ct. 1438, J.A. at 225 (2007) (No, 05-1120) (Declaration of Michael Maceracken at ~
5(c)) 2006 WL 2569818. ' . .
85 Massachusetts, 127 S, Ct. at 1456 n.20 (citing Declaration of ChristIan Jacqz)
(discussing "possible" effects of sea-level rise over the next century).
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this regard, the Massachusetts petitioners faced a dilemma: It might be
possible to argue that their injuries were concrete and particularized or
actual or imminent, but not both at the same time.
Justice Stevens's opinion for the majority took two steps to avoid
these difficulties and ease the path to standing, altering or inventing
precedent in the process. First, he declared "that States are not normal
litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.I'" Rather,
Stevens announced, states are subject to "special solicitude" when
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts." Such a special
standard had not been identified before;it was a totally new rule. Where
did it comefrom?A century-old case called Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
CO.88
In Tennessee Copper, the State of Georgia brought suit in federal
court against a polluting factory across the border in Tennessee under
the federal common-lawof nuisance.w The case had nothing to do with
standing. Rather it was an interstate-nuisance suit of the sort that
would be preempted by the Clean Air Act were it brought today.v"
Specifically, the case involved Georgia's effort to obtain an injunction
against upwind polluters across the Tennessee state border.s! Justice
Holmes held for the Court that Georgia could obtain equitable relief-
unavailable to private parties-because of the state's "quasi-sovereign"
interest in its territory." Yet, it is one thing to hold that one state cannot
foul the air of its neighbor and that the neighboring state may seek
equitable relief on behalf of its citizenry in federal court. It is quite
another to maintain that a state's ability to vindicate such a claim on
behalf of its citizens gives rise to a "special solicitude"when a state sues
in federal court to invoke the regulatory apparatus of administrative
agencies.
86 Id: at 1454.
87 Id. at 1455.
88 206 U,S, 230 (1907),
89 Id. at 236-137.
90 See Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal
Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REv. 717, 768--69 n.476 (2004) (citing
Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law To Affect the
Location o{Pollution, 27 ENVTL, L, 403, 474 (1997)).
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of whether
the federal Clean Air Act preempts federal common law in disputes over
transboundary air pollution, it is widely assumed to do so, particularly in light of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which created a comprehensive federal
permit scheme similar to that established by the Clean Water Act.
ta.
91 Tennessee Copper. 206 U.S. at 236.
9' Id. at 237.
Interestingly enough, Tennessee Copperwas nowhere to be found in
Massachusetts's briefs. Neither, for that matter, was it cited by any of
the parties or amici in their briefs, nor was it considered by any of the
opinions below. State amici Arizona et aI., argued that states had unique
mterests worthy of consideration in the standing inquiry, but still did
not mention Tennessee Copperv: This was not surprising for, as noted
above, Tennessee Copper had nothing to dowith the law of standing. So
why did the Court rely on Tennessee Copper?As best as one can tell, the
idea of relying upon Tennessee Copper came from Justice Kennedy, the
swing vote in Massachusetts, who referenced the Tennessee Copper
opinion as Massachusetts's "best case" supporting standing during oral
argument.s-
Even with Tennessee Copper supporting injury, Massachusetts faced
a significant standing hurdle-a hurdle the majority opinion leaped
without much care for the meaning of prior caselaw. TheMassachusetts
Court was not simply "solicitous"of states. It weakened the traditional
requirements for Article III standing as well. As noted above, under
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, standing requires that the plaintiff have
suffered an "injury in fact" that is "actual or imminent" and "concrete
and particularized."" The injury must be "fairly trace[ableJ" to the
conduct complained of, and it must be likely that "the injury will be
'redressed by a favorable decision.'"96The Court purported to adhere to
this "most demanding" standard in evaluating Massachusetts's claims.
In actuality the Massachusetts majority interpreted Lujan's
requirements in a most forgiving way, particularly with regard to
causation and redressability.
To evade the traditional standing requirements, the majority
opinion relied upon language from Lujan noting that the "normal
standards for redressability and immediacy"are relaxed when a statute
vests a litigant with a "procedural right .... "97 In Justice Kennedy's
words, "'Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains
of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before.'"98This is the rationale for recognizing environmental
litigants' standing to enforce other laws that impose only procedural
r
I
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93 See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
MassachlUietts, 127 S, Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380.
94 Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Massachusetts, 127 S, Cl. 143S (No. 05-1120),
2006 WL 3431932.
96 See supra Part 1. .
96 L . D' d f W'ldl"e 504 US 555 56lHi1 (1992) (citing SIIDon v. E.ujan v. eren ers 0 1 W, ..,
Ky.Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S, 26,38,41--43 (1976)).
97 t« at 572 n.7. (K d J
98 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 enne y, -,
concurring»,
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obligations on regulatory agencies, such as the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969,99("NEPA"J,which requires government agencies to
conduct environmental analyses before undertaking actions that could
have adverse environmental effects.'ooSuch provisions are common in
environmental law, NEPA being the paradigmatic example. Section
307(b) of the Clean Air Act is not such a provision, however. Rather,
Section 307(bJ is a simple jurisdictional provision; it does not create a
new cause of action.w- Nor did it meet the requirement, restated by the
majority, that '''Congressmust at the very least identify the injury it
seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to
bring suit.'"102The Court cited this provision and the language in Lujan
justifying a relaxed consideration of the redressability requirement
nonetheless.
If the majority stretched the standing inquiry at the margins to
accommodate the petitioners' claim of injury, it rent Lujan's fabric in
considering causation and redressability. Under Massachusetts, any
contribution of any size to a cognizable injury is sufficient for causation,
and any step, no matter how small, is sufficient to provide the necessary
redress. While citing the requirement that a favorable decision must
'''relieve a discrete injury" to the plaintiff.l'" the majority held that any
government action that, all else equal, reduces (or at least retards the
growth of)global emissions ofgreenhouse gases by any amount, however
small, will suffice.After all, Justice Stevens explained, "lal reduction in
domestic emissions would slowthe pace ofglobal emissions increases, no
matter what happens elsewhere."lO'Yet, given the rate of growth in
greenhouse-gas emissions worldwide, irrespective of what happens in
the United States, this is anything hut a self-evident proposition. The
most Massachusetts could hope for is a reduction of projected sea-level
rise of a few centimeters over the next century. It is hard to argue that
such insignificant relief would satisfy a "rigid" application of the
redressability requirement outlined in prior cases. If Hein involved the
narrow application of precedent, there was nothing particularly
precedented about the holdings inMassachusetts.
99 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (2000).
100 See id: § 4332 (2000 & Supp. M.
101 See Clean Air Act of 1970 § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(bXl) (2000).
102 Moseochueeue, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring».
103 Id. at 1458 (emphasis added) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15
(1982)).
104 Id.
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IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS IN HEIN AND MASSACHUSETTS
Both Hein and Massachusetts involved types of generalized
grievances. AEsuch, both involvedthe sort ofclaim forwhich separation
of powers concerns are greatest. Of the two cases, Massachusetts
challenged settled law and modifiedcurrent doctrine.Hein, on the other
hand, upheld and stood fast by an older precedent, albeit a precedent
that was poorly reasoned and widelycriticized.
The two cases' respective treatment of precedent is not the only
respect in which the two cases differ. Below the surface, the two
decisions embody contrasting conceptionsof the role of standing in the
separation of powers. It may not be fair to ascribe this doctrinal tension
to the Court as a whole, however. Onlyonemember of the Court, Justice
Kennedy, was in the majority in both cases. Yet insofar as Justice
Kennedy is the controlling vote in cases such as these in whichthe Court
is closely divided, and insofar as each case's holding was responsive to
Justice Kennedy's own idiosyncratic views about standing and
justiciability, this doctrinal tension warrants investigation.
In preserving Flast, Hein embraced the importance of allowing
taxpayer standing to challenge legislative exercises of the taxing and
spending power that violate the Establishment Clause. The Executive
Branch, on the other hand, should, in the words ofJustice Kennedy,"be
free, as a general matter, to discovernew ideas, to understand pressing
public demands, and to find creative responses to address governmental
concerns."105According to Justice Kennedy, "courts must be reluctant to
expand their authority by requiring intrusive and unremitting judicial
management of the way the Executive Branch performs its duties."106
Even if there were no individual with standing to challengethe conduct
at issue, executive officials "are not excusedfrommaking constitutional
determinations in the regular course of their duties. Government
officials must make a conscious decision to obey the Constitution
whether or not their acts can be challenged in a court of law and then
must conform their actions to these principled determinations."107Yet
the existence of such an obligation does not ensure complian~ewi.th
constitutional limitations nor does it obviate any need for judicial
review. Preserving e;ecutive latitude in poli~ymaking and
administration may increase the likelihood of Estabhshment Clause
violations, even if only because of an occasional,.poorly informed
understanding of relevant constitutional limits. It WIll also redu~e the
proportion of such violations that are ever redressed. This IS the
105 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106 [d. at 2573.
107 Id.
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unavoidable consequence of ensuring the Executive is free to "discover
new ideas" and "find creative responses" to new issues. Limiting judicial
review of executive actions effectively prevents the full enforcement of
relevant constitutional limitations.
This permissive approach to potential Executive-Branch misconduct
is quite different from that which we observe in the environmental
context. Most major federal environmental laws contain expansive
citizen-suit provisions that authorize private suits against implementing
agencies and regulated firms. The explicit purpose of these provisions is
to allow for "private attorneys general" to invoke the jurisdiction of the
courts to oversee executive fealty to the law. Such private attorneys
general are delegated authority to assume the mantle of the Lorax and
"speak for the trees."108Trees cannot have standing themselves, but
people can have standing to sue in their stead.
Environmental citizen-suit provisions typically provide standing to
the limits ofArticle III. The rationale here is that such broad standing is
necessary because the Executive cannot be trusted to fully enforce
existing environmental laws. Government agencies are constrained by
limited resources, dispersed information, and political pressures.
Different administrations will also have different priorities for
regulatory implementation and enforcement. Even assuming that every
administration would like to fully enforce those environmental rules on
the books-a highly questionable assumption-this is not possible.tw As
in the Establishment Clause context, citizen suits are "a mechanism for
controlling unlawfully inadequate enforcement of the law.""o In the
words of the late Judge Skelly Wright, citizen suits help ensure "that
important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls ofCongress, are not
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways ofthe federal bureaucracy.P!-
Insofar as the Court has adopted a broad conception of judicially
cognizable injuries in environmental cases, it has endorsed the idea that
judicial oversight of executive activity is necessary and proper. Insofar as
Massachusetts expands the ability of states, and perhaps individuals, to
108 See DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX23 (1971) ("I am the Lorax. I speak for the trees. , . for
the trees have no tongues.").
109 See Richard Lazarus, Panel II: Public Versus Private Regulation, 21 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 431, 472 (1994) ("It is not feasible to assume that the government is going to engage in
the inspections and the enforcement necessary to ensure compliance with the
standards .... ").
lIO Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 165 (1992).
111 See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971); cf. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLKU. L. REv. 881, 897 (1983)
(arguing that one purpose of standing limitations is to allow some actions to be "lost or
misdirected" within the federal bureaucracy).
invoke federal jurisdiction for fairly broad, undifferentiated harms it
provides for further judicial oversight of executive compliance with
relevant legal requirements. Massachusetts explicitlysuggestedthat this
is nec.essarybecause states surrendered portions of their sovereigntyin
adopting the Federal Constitution, justifying "specialsolicitude"to state
requests for judicial intervention.w
The argument for broad standing in environmental cases runs
counter to the rationale for limiting taxpayer standing to challenges of
legislative actions. Unlike in the Establishment Clause context,
environmental citizen-suits seek to enforce statutory mandates, rather
than constitutional limitations. An underlying premise is that Congress
is unable (or unwilling) to enforce its own enactments. Yet why is this
so? The legislative branch maintains many oversight and enforcement
powers. If it wants environmental laws to be followedto the letter, it can
use statutory mandates, the appropriations process, and oversight
hearings to ensure adequate enforcement.In this context, the argument
for second-guessing executive decision-makingwhen there is a broad,
generalized grievance-a "political"matter as discussedinMorbury-v-«
seems relatively weak. Where an environmental concern affects the
nation as a whole, however, why shouldwe assume that ideologicallyor
otherwise motivated private litigants are in a better position to ensure
the proper level of environmental enforcement than the people's
representatives in Congress and the Executive?If the legislature fails to
exercise effective oversight of executive implementation of a federal
statute, perhaps this indicates that legislative majorities no longer
support pre-existing statutes.!" After all, Congress routinely fails to
provide adequate funding for complete enforcement of regulatory
programs. Less-than-complete enforcement of environmental statutes
may be the result of majority preferences. If not, there is at least a
potential opportunity for political redress.
Contrast this with the dynamic observed in the Establishment
Clause context. The reason for the Establishment Clause is to prevent a
religious majority from enshrining its religious preferences at the
expense of a religious minority. In taxpayer suits, the purpose of
standing is to prevent the allocation of tax dollars to support
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1,
112 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455.
113 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). .
114 Such underenforcement may also reflect the politi,cal obstacles to ~ffect1Ve
mobilization of diffuse constituencies that support gr~ater enVl~onmental pro~ctlOn. s~
Jonathan H Adler Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and: EnmTonmenta
Protection, 12 DUKE' ENV'I'L. L. & POL'y F. 39, 45 (2001) (summarizing arguments) .. The
..:l:~. • t ge ting a need for broad citizen-
<.UlucultyWIth these and other theoretical arguIDell S BUg S . . . d
suit standing is that they do not seem to conform with th~available empirical evidence an
may not actually enhance environmental protection. See id. at 46-51.
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majoritarian religious preferences at the expense of those with minority
preferences. Whatever degree of "separation" one believes the
Establishment Clause requires, this is the nature of the harm that
judicial review is designed to avoid. If a religious majority were to
establish religion at the expense of religious minorities through
legislative action, there is little prospect of a sufficient "political"remedy
for a disadvantaged religious (or even secular) minority. In such cases,
broad standing is necessary for judicial review to serve a counter-
majoritarian function and protect minority interests
This rationale would seem to apply equally to executive action. If
the Executive Branch were to establish a minority religious preference,
we have relatively high confidence that political remedies will be
sufficient to curtail the violation. A religious majority has ample means
to protect its interests through the political process, so the legislature is
unlikely to sit idly bywhere the Executive acts unconstitutionally in this
regard. Yet where the Executive takes action to establish a majority
religious preference, we have comparatively little confidence in the
likelihood of effective legislative or political oversight.u! A religious
majority is much less likely to seek to correct such unconstitutional
actions; it may even support them. If anything, given the unitary nature
of executive authority, and inertia within the legislative process, the risk
of executive transgressions would seem to be greater than the risk of
legislative violations.
The point here is not that the Court should have granted standing
in Hein. Rather, the point is that if the justification for allowing
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases is to check the
tendency of the political process to entrench majoritarian religious
preferences, then the argument for broad citizen standing would seem to
be greater in the Establishment Clause context than in the
environmental context, for it is only in the former that the judiciary is
called upon to playa counter-majoritarian role. If legislative oversight
and political checks are ever sufficient to ·obviate the need for judicial
review of executive action, it will be where the legislature is protecting
its own interests, or those of a political majority. Such checks will be
least sufficient where executive violations of constitutional limitations
come at the expense of political minorities. Thus, the Court-or at least
the controlling vote of Justice Kennedy-has it backwards. In Hein and
Massachusetts, the Court is more permissive where the argument for
judicial oversight is stronger, and exercises greater scrutiny where the
case forjudicial oversight is weaker.
115 Cf. Hein; 127 S. Ct. at 2571 I'Tn the unlikely event" of executive actions violating
the Establishment Clause "Congress could quickly step in. ").
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The argument sketched here only concerns the relative strength of
the arguments for altering traditional standing rules in the context of
generalized grievances. If both cases involve qnestions of generalized
grievances one could still conclude that neither (or both) should be
justiciable. Both cases involved questions of extreme importance that
relate to fundamental values-our relationship with God and our
obligations to the earth and future generations. Yet such value-laden
questions are typically matters left to the political process, rather than
the judiciary, save in rare circumstances where judicial review is
necessary to playa counter-majoritarian role.
CONCLUSION
Hein and Massachusetts did not capture as much public or media
attention as other cases from the October 2006 term. Citizen standing
may not be as "sexy" a topic as abortion, race, or free speech. Yet
standing cases are particularly important within our legal system, and
have implications for the separation of powers. Whether Article III
jurisdiction extends to certain classes of cases directly affects the extent
ofjudicial oversight ofthe politicalbranches.
Separation of powers is a fundamental aspect of American
constitutional government. As the Court observedover thirty years ago,
"ltlhe principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract
generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the
document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787."116
The importance of separation-of-powers principles "transcends the
convenienceof the moment."ll7Thus it should raise concernsthat recent
cases reflect a confused understanding or arbitrary application of
separation-of-powers principles. In my view, the urgency of
environmental concerns or the importance of the Establishment Clause
do not justify transgressing the traditional bounds of Article III. All I
have sought to show here, however, is that the importance of such
matters cannot justify the particular contours of standing doctrine
embedded in the Court's recent standing holdings.
It may be unsettling to consider that standing doctrine pres~mes
that some cases can never be heard in federal court. Someconstitutional
questions must be resolved through the politicalprocess.Standing is but
one way of enforcing such limits on judicial power,but it is a limitation
that courts may be reluctant to impose. The jurisprudence of what we
might call the "Kennedy Court" exhibits a reluctance to acknowledgethe
116 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,124 (1976) (per curiam). .
117 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft NOISe, Inc.,
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existence of issues lying beyond the scope of judicial power.
Massachusetts involved the omnipresent concern of global warming, and
a court majority could not bear to stay away. Even where limitations on
judicial authority are maintained, as in Hein, the Court clings to its
reluctance to shut the courthouse door on such claims.
In the long run, excessive judicial involvement could threaten the
vitality of separation of powers and can undermine the vitality of self-
government. This is particularly so in areas such as the environment
and religious establishment, that touch upon fundamental, deeply held
values. When we think about the purposes of standing, we may wish to
consider the words of Justice Sutherland from his opinion in
Frothingham v. Mellon:
The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To
the legislative department has been committed the duty of making
laws; to the executivethe duty 01'executing them; and to the judiciary
the duty of interpreting an" ~11ing them in cases properly brought
before the courts. The genH "Ie is that neither department may,
invade the province of the other and neither may control, direct or
restrain the action of the other, ... We have no power per se to review
and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are
unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the
justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a
justiciable issue, is made to fest upon such an act. Then the power
exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to
the controversy. It amounts to little more than the negative power to
disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would
stand in the way of the enforcement of a legal right. The party who
invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is
invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally. If a case for preventive relief be presentedj.] the court
enjoins, in effect, not the execution of the statute, but the acts of the
official,the statute notwithstanding. Here the parties plaintiff have no
such case. Looking through forms of words to the substance of their
complaint, it is merely that officialsof the executivedepartment of the
government are executing and will execute an act of Congress asserted
to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent. To do so
wouldbe not to decidea judicial controversy,but to assume a position
of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal
department, an authority whichplainly we donot possess.P"
What Justice Sutherland contemplates is a more limited role for
federal courts in pressing social and political conflicts. It is a far cry from
118 262 U.S. 447, 488--89 (1923).·
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the "judicial supremacy" that marked the Rehnquist Court,119but it may
well be a more proper role for the Court in our democratic republic.
. . . 'll' H Rehnquist, the Man W/w Devised
119 See Walter Dellmger In Memonam. Wt wm. .11 1'- mJid/21256851, 4 2005 http"www.s ate.co
the Natural Law of Federalism, S~TE,S~pt: ' d i"a! ontribution will not ultimately
('"ChiefJustice Rehnquist's most sigmfic~tJunsPru:~~l~ to entrench the supremacy of
be states' rights, however, but the ~tepshis court too d the states."); Jeffrey Rosen,
the judicial branch over the president, the. Congress, tro.;g 87 ("{U]nder [Rehnquist'sl
Rehnquist the Great?, THE ATLANTIC, April 2005, ~ ",ric of judicial supremacy and
leadership the Court indulged in an overconfident .rde higher rate than in any other
struck down thirty federal laws in one seven-year perto -a
Court in history,"),
